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Abstract With more than 60 percent of China’s 1.34 billion 
population, about 50 percent of its most productive arable 
land, and the world’s second largest and rapidly growing 
national GDP exposed to flooding of various kinds, China has 
an intractable flood problem. Envisioning potential impacts 
of climate change and continued intensification of floodplain 
development driven by rapid industrialization and urbaniza-
tion, it is very likely that China will see a continued increase of 
exposure to floods this century. This overview article outlines 
and discusses fundamental dilemmas, plausible pathways, 
and key options for managing future flood risks in China in the 
context of rapid socioeconomic transition and climate change. 
Fundamental dilemmas are the embedded difficult trade-off 
choices, from balancing economic development with flood 
vulnerability reduction, to coordination and cooperation among 
increasingly diverse actors and across scales. Among plausi-
ble pathways, this article argues that a resilience strategy 
for managing flood risk is desirable. It would require human 
adjustment to flood, not by aiming for full protection and 
control but by adjusting our use of floodplains, integrating and 
experimenting with a wide range of flood risk management 
options, so that a dynamic balance is maintained between 
exposure and coping capacity and flood risk is contained at an 
acceptable level. Embracing variability and uncertainty lies at 
the heart of such a flood resilience centered paradigm. Reduc-
ing the flood toll cannot be had without trade-offs in economic 
development, food production, and agricultural productivity.
Keywords China, flood risk dilemmas, flood management 
pathways, flood risk management, flood resilience strategy
1 Introduction
Globally, recent decades have seen rapid increases in losses 
due to natural disasters (UNISDR 2009). Despite progress in 
science and technology and the tremendous amount of atten-
tion and investment, vulnerability to flood disasters, in China 
and the world alike, has increased. There is a range of expla-
nations for such a great paradox (White, Kates, and Burton 
2001; IPCC 2011). Yet, in the case of flood losses, this also 
reflects the fundamental dilemma concerning flood risk 
management—the use and development of floodplains, while 
increasing the exposure to floods, are also vital for improving 
the general well-being of the populations and the economy of 
regions. The problem lies in the imbalance between exposure 
and coping and adaptive capacity. While coping capacity has 
also increased as countries have developed and both economi c 
conditions and governance have improved, the pace has not 
been sufficient to compensate for the increase in exposure 
and vulnerability, particularly in rapidly emerging economies 
(UNISDR 2009).
Into the twenty-first century, there has been a worldwide 
significant shift in the management of risks associated with 
river and coastal flooding (Harvey, Evans et al. 2009; Harvey, 
Thorne et al. 2009; Green 2010). The essence of this shift is 
moving away from control-oriented flood defense to a risk-
based, more holistic approach, with an emphasis on system 
perspective and sustainability. There is now a strong recogni-
tion, at least within the flood management community, that 
sustainable flood mitigation solutions have to be achieved 
through integrated actions (White 1994; APFM 2003; Cheng 
2005; UNDP 2004; UNISDR 2004). This shift can be traced 
back to the work of geographer Gilbert F. White and others 
who demonstrated convincingly the inadequacy of relying 
on engineering solutions alone to address flood problems. It 
was White who first argued that, instead of trying to control 
nature, society needs to learn to live more compatibly with 
the natural occurrence of floods (White 1945; Burton 1962; 
Burton, Kates, and White 1978).
Embracing variability and uncertainty lies at the heart of 
the new flood resilience centered paradigm. The fundamental 
and arguably most difficult change required is therefore for 
decision makers and society at large to accept that it is neither 
possible nor necessary to control all floods. A resilience strat-
egy for managing flood risk would require human adjustment 
to flood, not by aiming for full protection and control but by 
adjusting our use of floodplains, integrating and experiment-
ing with a wide range of flood risk management options, so 
that a dynamic balance is maintained between exposure and 
coping capacity.
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China has an intractable flood problem. Each year, China 
suffers billions in economic losses and hundreds to thousands 
of lives are lost. Looking into the future, the country’s 
difficult flood problem is only going to become worse. By 
the middle of this century, China will be home to about 
1.6 billion people and more than 70 percent of them will be 
living in cities on floodplains (Cheng 2008). If the current 
trends of socioeconomic development continue, China will 
become the largest economy in the world and close to 80 per-
cent of its productivity will come from floodplains. Per capita 
GDP will at least quadruple its current value; thus the assets 
on the floodplains will keep on increasing exponentially. It is 
likely that climate change will also significantly increase both 
the intensity and the frequency of extreme weather events, 
making floods an even more severe threat (Shankman, Davis, 
and Leeuw 2009; IPCC 2011). 
For millennia, China’s flood management experience has 
predominantly centered on controlling floods through engi-
neering structural measures, either by blocking or channeling 
the floodwater. For example, the legislative and institutional 
apparatus for flood management, such as the Flood Control 
Law of 1998, focuses primarily on controlling flood hazard 
and lacks almost completely any component of floodplain 
management, such as flood risk zoning and land-use regula-
tion. To this day, there is little or no regional-scale floodplain 
planning (Shankman, Davis, and Leeuw 2009). Flood zoning 
and land-use planning measures in flood management remain 
at an embryonic stage (Cheng 2008).
As has been concluded by many analysts and observers, 
the increasing trend of flood losses, particularly during the 
1990s, has stimulated a profound reflection and rethinking of 
flood management strategies in China (Cheng 2006; Harvey, 
Thorne et al. 2009). In 2003, the Ministry of Water Resources 
of China proposed to redirect flood prevention from flood 
control to flood management, which has led to a major 
institutional shift to enhancing understanding about intercon-
nected systemic issues and risk awareness. Flood prevention 
work has thus shifted from attempts to eliminate floods to 
building capacity to live with and endure floods (GHD and 
IWHR 2006; Cheng 2008).
Three main aspects are central to this shift of overall 
strategy in flood management. First is the shift away from 
the notion of “full protection” to an acceptance that the flood 
defense system will have to be balanced with social and 
economic development on floodplains. Second is the shift 
from managing flood hazard to emphasizing the importance 
of floodplain management. Third is the approach to manage 
floods not only as a risk, but also as an opportunity and 
resource. This has involved a paradigmatic change from flood 
control to (ideally) controlled flooding. It is clear that this 
shift in China is consistent with and a reflection of an overall 
global rethinking and paradigm shift on humans’ relationship 
with floods and how flood risk can be managed in a changing 
climate and an increasingly interconnected world. Embracing 
variability and uncertainty lies at the heart of such a new flood 
management paradigm. 
While the shift in China from preventing flood events to 
managing flood risks is a fundamental step forward towards a 
more holistic and comprehensive approach to live with flood 
risk, it does not guarantee in any sense that the flood problem 
will be resolved. Fundamental dilemmas are entangled with 
flood problems in China. To what extent can vulnerability be 
significantly reduced without interfering with the progress in 
economic gains and improvements in overall well-being? 
To what extent are politicians as well as the general public 
prepared to accept the major investments that will be required 
for the transition to a more robust resilience strategy? What is 
an acceptable level of flood risk and how should it be deter-
mined? Understanding the fundamental dilemmas is essential 
for addressing the questions that are critical for devising a 
strategy that charts a path through complex science-policy-
practice interfaces and leads towards balanced, coordinated, 
and sustainable solutions. 
The following two sections outline three fundamental 
dilemmas and three plausible scenarios of future pathways 
for managing flood risk in China. The article concludes with 
some remarks on the importance of embracing uncertainty in 
developing a resilience strategy. 
2 Three Fundamental Dilemmas for 
China
A dilemma refers to a situation that requires a choice between 
options that are or seem equally unfavorable or mutually 
exclusive (American Heritage Dictionary). In essence, 
dilemmas are about making choices between alternative 
courses of action in which, in this case, trade-offs between 
risks and benefits are central and inescapable. Thus these 
dilemmas, by definition, defy solutions that appeal to all 
parties in that trade-offs exist in the course of achieving 
the resolution of desired societal wants or needs and these 
trade-offs must be balanced and negotiated.
The contextual environment for flood risks in China is 
now undergoing rapid change due to global processes (such 
as globalization and global environmental change) and 
regional and local processes (such as rapid urbanization, 
industrialization, and social transformation). Deeply embed-
ded in this changing context, China faces a set of fundamental 
dilemmas for managing its flood risk, where trade-offs 
are inevitably contentious yet must be made in balancing 
complex relationships between risk reduction and economic 
development.
2.1 “Space for Water” versus “Space for People”
By definition, floodplains are the land that could and would 
be flooded periodically. When floodplains are settled and 
developed, the competition for space between people and 
water (that is, floods) becomes the basic dilemma. With 
more than 60 percent of its 1.34 billion population, about 
50 percent of its most productive arable land, and close to 
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80 percent of the world’s second largest and rapidly growing 
national GDP depending on floodplains, China faces intense 
competition between “space for water” and “space for peo-
ple”—a fundamental dilemma between flood risk reduction 
and economic development on China’s floodplains.
Nothing illustrates this dilemma more vividly than the 
so-called flood detention / retention area dilemma in China. 
Since the 1950s, an important part of China’s flood manage-
ment strategy has been to establish designated flood detention 
and retention zones to accommodate excessive waters. 
Currently, China has 98 such designated zones, with a total 
area of 35,000 km2 and a total storage capacity of about 
100 billion m3. Yet, through decades of encroachment these 
zones now contain about 2 million hectares of cropland and 
more than 17 million people (Cheng 2005; Cheng 2008). 
Thus, in order for the designated zones to serve the intended 
flood adjustment function, China will have to find a way 
to resettle the 17 million people and change the ongoing 
settlement processes—not an easy dilemma to solve.
Furthermore, this difficult dilemma in all likelihood 
will only get worse. Within the floodplains, intensification 
of human activities and a shifting spatial concentration of 
both people and wealth will significantly increase China’s 
exposure to floods in the coming decades. While China’s 
population growth has slowed considerably due to the strict 
implementation of the one-child policy, its total population 
will likely grow to about 1.6 billion around 2030 before 
declining gradually. China will add the equivalent of the 
current U.S. population in the next twenty years, and the 
majority of this population increase will live in cities on 
floodplains. Even if this population intensification occurs at a 
slower pace than that experienced historically, the economic 
intensification on floodplains in the coming decades will 
still be tremendous and constitute a real challenge in Chinese 
history. It will shift the nature of the flood problem in China 
from a predominantly agricultural concern to an urban 
concern and food security threat.
This fundamental dilemma underlies the general trade-off 
between flood risk reduction and economic development—it 
is simply not possible to have both. Choices must be made, 
ranging from complete retreat from floodplains to bearing the 
full flood losses for economic gains. Anything in between 
is caught between irreconcilable goals. So far, the primary 
approach that China has employed to address this dilemma is 
to protect development from floods by extensive construction 
of flood defense infrastructures. Despite major investments, 
economic losses continue to increase (Cheng, Wu, and Wang 
2004). The rising flood damage trend highlights the rapid 
increase of vulnerability due to intensification of floodplain 
development and assets accumulation. It also indicates the 
inherent limitations of the engineering approach.
Increasing flood vulnerability is essentially the result of 
the rapid development of China’s floodplains. Vulnerability 
reduction thus requires a much broader approach to deal with 
the trade-offs between economic development and flood 
risk reduction in the context of multiple stresses and multiple 
vulnerabilities. Despite rapid development in recent decades, 
hundreds of millions of people in China are still living in 
poverty. Environmental deterioration and ecological destruc-
tion are widespread and devastating (Liu and Diamond 2005). 
China faces the dilemma of the need to achieve overall liveli-
hood improvement while seeking to build societal resilience 
against floods. Flood risk reduction therefore will have to 
be integrated into or balanced against the broader context of 
poverty reduction, environmental and ecosystem manage-
ment, improving overall well-being (longevity, income, 
education, health, and so forth), and sustainable development. 
It is a challenge that flood managers would like to avoid.
2.2 Cooperation versus Conflict
The second fundamental dilemma in flood risk management 
that China faces lies in the governance challenges where 
coordination and cooperation are central for resolving the 
inevitable conflicting interests among regions and social 
groups. Cooperation is a key potential resource needed for 
any viable future flood management approach. At the same 
time, economic decentralization, market reform and privati-
zation, and growing regional and social disparities make 
cooperation increasingly difficult to achieve.
Reducing vulnerability is a complex task that involves an 
increasingly diverse range of actors, both public and private, 
concerning land-use decisions and the built environment 
(Hall 2008). All measures designed to reduce flood risks will 
have different spatial and social impacts. They typically 
involve spatial conflict (upstream and downstream, left and 
right riverbanks, urban and rural) and social tensions (among 
social groups, priorities, and so forth), thus demanding an 
enlarged capacity for balancing, coordination, and coopera-
tion among regions and social groups. At the same time, with 
economic decentralization, the centralized command and 
control system in China has been weakened in its ability 
to “force” coordination and cooperation among regions and 
different stakeholders. The maneuvering space for coordina-
tion and cooperation is becoming increasingly small, while 
the actors and interests are becoming ever more diverse. A 
combination of balanced government and market instruments 
has yet to appear on the horizon. China still lacks the required 
and enabling institutional infrastructure. In the current 
Chinese flood management system, the roles of the various 
actors remain opaque and ill-defined and constitute major 
obstacles for effective coordination and cooperation. 
The coordination and cooperation dilemma makes the 
flood risk management goal-setting process more challeng-
ing. What would be an acceptable level of risk reduction 
against which flood risk management should be measured, 
monitored, and evaluated? Setting such a goal is critical yet 
extremely difficult and contentious. An acceptable level of 
flood risk will always be problematic and uncertain since it 
rests on a wide range of processes, factors, and conflicting 
values. Often, as people get richer, their demand for safety 
correspondingly increases. But the trade-offs between safety 
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and wealth are highly sensitive. Making people safer and less 
rich may not be politically popular, because the risk reduction 
gains will be opaque and highly uncertain. Balancing trade-
offs between short-term and long-term goals is a difficult 
dilemma in determining an acceptable level of flood risk.
Related to such goal-setting, a dilemma also exists with 
corresponding requirements for investment and capacity 
development. While flood response capacity will undoubt-
edly increase as overall development progresses, to keep pace 
with increasing exposure, an extra pace of capacity develop-
ment is needed. Yet who will pay for the extra pace of capac-
ity development that will be required to stabilize the risk or 
even reduce it? What is the right balance between structural 
and nonstructural measures, and between government and 
market finances?
2.3 Coping with Changing Climate and Uncertainty 
The third fundamental dilemma comes with the looming 
potential climate change impact, and with it, critical uncer-
tainties about the patterns of future flood regimes (IPCC 
2011). Planning and investment in flood protection infrastruc-
tures—such as dams and dykes—depend on predicting future 
climate variability. But climate change brings inherent unpre-
dictability of future flood hazard patterns, adding a profound 
uncertainty for devising flood prevention and mitigation 
methods and investments. The climate change dilemma 
requires long-term planning and resolving a series of 
perplexing climate change uncertainties.
On a global scale, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has confirmed that climate change is now 
altering the predictability, intensity, and geographical distri-
bution of many weather-related hazards through increased 
intensity of the water cycle and glacial melt and sea level rise 
(UNISDR 2009; IPCC 2011). At a national and regional scale, 
impacts of climate change on flood hazards are even more 
uncertain, while global trends seem to be moving towards an 
increasing frequency and intensity of extreme events (Milly 
et al. 2002; UNISDR 2009). The average temperature in the 
Yangtze delta region, for example, is predicted to increase by 
between 2.3 and 3.3ºC by 2050 (NDRC 2007). This signifi-
cant change in temperature is expected to lead to an array of 
changes in precipitation patterns, sea level rise, and coastal 
storm surges (Harvey, Evans et al. 2009).
From the perspective of human-environment interactions 
in coupled social-ecological systems, these dilemmas are all 
interlinked and characterized by great uncertainties, dynamic 
feedbacks, threshold effects, and nonlinear changes (Liu et al. 
2007). They are fundamentally dilemmas between managing 
specific resilience (to floods) versus building a greater 
general resilience (Walker et al. 2004; Folke et al. 2010). 
These basic dilemmas place flood risk management decisions 
firmly in the domain of fundamental challenges to the gover-
nance of complex adaptive systems and sustainability, where 
coordination, cooperation, and social relations are essential 
areas that demand innovation. With these dilemmas in mind, 
the next section discusses some key factors for future flood 
risk management, before outlining scenarios of plausible 
pathways.
3 Key Factors for Future Flood Risk 
Management
The looming climate change impacts and the rapidly chang-
ing socioeconomic conditions in China raise serious ques-
tions relating to future increases in flood risk. How will flood 
risk change in the coming decades, what number and level of 
flood events can we anticipate and prepare for? What policy 
interventions are available? To what extent will floods be 
a risk to China’s long-term sustainable development? A 
complex array of factors shape and impact these issues.
Figure 1 is a schematic conceptual model of flood risk in 
the context of climate change and rapid socioeconomic transi-
tion. The key factors involve: (1) the major drivers, as well 
as the critical uncertainties associated with these drivers 
and their interactions; (2) the dynamics of vulnerability as 
determined by the covariance between exposure and response 
capacity that involves short-term coping and long-term 
adaptive capacity; and (3) the flood management system with 
both structural and nonstructural measures. 
The interaction of all these factors and processes deter-
mines the dynamic pattern and change of flood risks and their 
impacts on society. Many have illustrated clearly the interac-
tive nature of flood events and vulnerability in the context 
of a coupled human-environment system. Diverse drivers—
natural, human, and technical—act as pressure or multiple 
stresses on the flood risk system, leading to dynamic changes 
of the control variables that affect and reshape both the 
pattern of hazard and the system’s vulnerability to floods. 
The dynamics of vulnerability cannot be explained solely 
either by exposure (for example, population growth and 
intensification of economic activities) or response capacity 
(including both short-term coping and long-term adaptive 
capacities), but are the result of interactive change of both, or 
the covariance between them (Han 2011).
The key drivers for future flood risks in China are rapid 
socioeconomic transition, climate change, and the flood 
defense system itself. While the relative importance of these 
drivers will vary across river basins, they all are expected to 
experience major changes in the coming decades. The most 
challenging drivers for policy and decision makers are those 
associated with the highest levels of both risk importance and 
uncertainty, for example, potential climate change.
There is a general linkage between development stage 
and the pattern of losses from natural disasters. It is often the 
case that vulnerability tends to rise faster during the phase of 
transition (Sylves and Kershaw 2004). China today is in the 
midst of rapid urbanization and industrialization, which will 
almost certainly continue to increase human exposure to 
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floods. Rapid urbanization, for example, acts as both pathway 
and receptor in terms of increasing flood risk. As a pathway, 
urban expansion increases the proportion of the impermeable 
surfaces and intensifies runoff. The general trend of current 
urban development decreases storage and drainage capacity 
for storm water, and heightens the vulnerability of cities to 
floods and waterlogging (Shi et al. 2005; Harvey, Evans et al. 
2009).
In relation to the dynamics of vulnerability, the impact 
surrounding uncertainties arising from the changing socio-
economic transitions lies in whether and to what extent the 
growth of response capacity can match or exceed the increase 
in exposure (Kundzewicz and Menzel 2003). Examined 
globally, societal change and economic development are the 
chief culprits for increasing losses. If the current trends con-
tinue, global disaster losses will continue to outpace average 
economic growth (Bouwer et al. 2007).
In the coming decades, the transformation of the flood 
management system in China, spurred by ongoing institu-
tional shifts, is a critical process that will determine both the 
direction and pace of flood response capacity change. The 
critical uncertainties in this respect reside not only with 
leadership and investment, but also in capacity development 
at all levels.
China’s waterscape has been profoundly human-
transformed and the transformation continues with massive 
water engineering projects such as the Three Gorges Dam 
and the ongoing South-North Water Transfer. From a system 
perspective, these transformations will continue to trigger 
new feedbacks that change the dynamics of the hydrological 
regimes, which in turn interact with the changing climate and 
social economic conditions to set the basic parameters for 
future flood risks in China. Integrating the above system 
dynamics from the interactions between climate and socio-
economic change with uncertainties to form scenarios is a 
key for robust, flexible, and sustainable risk reduction in the 
future (Schanze 2009).
4 Pathways for the Future—Scenarios
With growing realization of the limited predictability of com-
plex adaptive systems, scenarios are gaining recognition as 
a useful way for examining future changes. A series of recent 
scenario-based future risk studies have all confirmed that 
losses from weather-related disasters are projected to increase, 
due to a combination of the increasing exposure of people and 
assets and expected changes in the global climate. In the 
Netherlands, Bouwer, Bubeck, and Aerts (2010) found that 
due to socioeconomic change alone, annual expected losses 
may increase by between 35 and 172 percent by 2040, 
as compared with a baseline situation in 2000. If no 
additional measures are taken to reduce flood probabilities 
or consequences, by 2040 a combination of climate and 
socioeconomi c changes may increase expected losses by 
between 96 and 719 percent. In the United Kingdom, the 
Flood Foresight project concluded that expected annual flood 
damages may increase twentyfold by the 2080s if flood risk 
management policy were to remain as it is at present (Evans 
et al. 2004; Hall, Sayers, and Dawson 2005). In Japan, Ikeda, 
Sato, and Fukuzono (2008) developed various flood risk 
scenarios in their search for resilient social systems against 
flood disasters.
In China, similar research is currently under-way in the 
Taihu (Tai Lake) basini through a China-UK scientific coop-
eration project initiated in late 2006, which adopted the UK 
Foresight Project scenario approach (Harvey, Evans et al. 
2009). While uncertainties exist in all the scenarios, given 
China’s current development trend, there is little doubt that 
China’s future flood losses will increase. This is not, however, 
to say that China’s vulnerability to flood must also increase. 
The future state of flood risks in China will not only be influ-
enced by critical uncertainties within the key drivers (for 
example, the speed and scale of climate and socioeconomic 
changes) (see Figure 1), but also by human choices that China 
makes today and along the way. Those choices will largely 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of flood risk in the context of climate change and rapid socioeconomic transition
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determine the pathway through which China’s flood risk 
management system will evolve.
To highlight the different pathways, three plausible future 
flood risk management scenarios are outlined below. The 
underlying logic for constructing the scenarios is the priority-
setting on dealing with the trade-offs between flood risk 
reduction and economic development. In the first scenario, 
China maximizes economic development while continuing 
to deal with floods largely through engineering approaches. 
In the second scenario, China prioritizes flood vulnerability 
reduction by developing and enforcing strict floodplain land-
use regulations to limit and control floodplain development. 
The third scenario outlines a pathway of “living with floods” 
in which building resilience is achieved through embracing 
and internalizing, rather than controlling, variability and 
uncertainty in balancing flood risk reduction and economic 
development.
4.1 Controlling Floods—Continuation of the 
Engineering Approach
This is the more or less “business as usual” scenario in which 
China maximizes economic development while it continues 
its massive investment in structural measures to control 
floods. In the short term, economic gains and a technocratic 
bias will very likely make this pathway irresistible. But in the 
long term, the result of this pathway will lead China to be 
increasingly locked into a highly rigid system vulnerable 
to catastrophic floods, a likely “building up for disaster” 
scenario.
Over a span of more than half a century since 1949, China 
has constructed a massive flood control structure system, 
including more than 85,000 reservoirs of various sizes,ii a 
total of 286,900 km of dykes/levees of various standards,iii 
and close to 100 designated flood detention and retention 
(storage) zones with a total area of 35,000 km2 and a total 
volume of 103 billion m3. Together, these measures form an 
extensive and effective flood defense system that has played 
a crucial role in flood control in China, reducing the annual 
inundation area by about 70 percent (as compared with that of 
1949) and reducing loss of life dramatically. In the 1950s, the 
average annual casualties due to floods in China were 8976; 
this number was reduced to 1507 in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century (Cheng 2008). 
While engineering protection has reduced the total area 
and frequency of inundation, the economic losses have grown 
enormously. Flood-related damage (yuan per hectare) has 
increased from 2190 in the 1960s to 12,120 in the 1980s 
and more than 20,000 in the 1990s on a national average. In 
rapidly developed areas such as the Tai Lake basin in the 
Yangtze delta, it has increased from 5565 in the 1960s to more 
than 30,000 in the 1980s (Shi and Pan 1997).
While structural approaches to flood control are essential 
to reduce flood losses, they have now reached a point where 
further expansion has become largely unsustainable. First, the 
“dyke syndrome” or the “dyke effect” (that is, dyke protec-
tion induces further development of floodplains that result 
in further demand for higher dykes) has been increasingly 
recognized as a driver for the erosion of long-term flood 
resilience of flood-prone human-environment systems. This 
has resulted in a continuously worsening discharge and flood 
level relationship.
Second, the cost-effectiveness of raising dykes/levees has 
been limited by economic, technological, and environmental 
constraints. Table 1 shows the investment feasibility calcu-
lated by the Institute of Water and Hydropower Research 
under the Ministry of Water Resources of China. It is 
extremely difficult to achieve the cost-effectiveness that is 
required (Xiang 2003). 
Third, the existing flood control structures require tremen-
dous investment in quality assurance and maintenance. More 
than one-third of the 85,000 reservoirs in China now require 
serious repairs.iv The levee systems along the major rivers are 
the result of centuries of construction, with extremely mixed 
quality and serious defects. Since 1998, more than 30 billion 
yuan have been invested in the levees in the middle and 
lower Yangtze River alone. Most of the investment has been 
in repair and infrastructure strengthening (Xiang 2003; Cheng 
2006).
Lastly, China is running out of places to construct major 
water infrastructures. With the completion of the Three 
Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, the Xiaolangdi Dam on 
the Yellow River, the Feilaixia Dam on the Pearl River, and 
the Nierji Dam on the Nen River in the Northeast, China has 
now basically run out of possible sites for major water control 
engineering constructions. In addition, many other factors 
(such as resettlement and migration and ecological impacts) 
are now raising heightened concerns about new dam 
construction. 
If China cannot break away from the current heavy 
reliance on its water engineering approach to flood control, 
one plausible future state of its flood risk system is an 
increasingly rigid system in which major investment is locked 
Table 1. Feasibility of flood loss reduction by raising levee protection standards






Investment required for feasible engineering 
construction (billion yuan)
25 10  2.5  <30
30  7.5  <90
50 12.5 <150
Source: Xiang 2003.
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into the vicious circle of increasing and maintaining the 
protection standard of the dyke/levee system. At the same 
time, the natural flood carrying capacity of the rivers as well 
as the riverine ecosystems will remain in continuous decline, 
and waterlogging in cities will become intractable.
While it sounds highly undesirable, this scenario is not 
only plausible but highly likely. This is the least-resisted path-
way in the existing system because it simply requires doing 
business more or less as usual. In addition, compared to many 
developed countries, the standard of the flood control struc-
tures in China still has much catching up to do. For example, 
while Japan and China share a very similar percentage in 
population and assets on the floodplains, most cities in Japan 
are protected for 500- to 1000-year floods whereas most 
of the cities in China currently are only protected for 20- to 
50-year floods. Furthermore, controlling floods is politically 
and socially much more straightforward than dealing with 
vulnerability reduction. Last but not least, many nested inter-
ests or “systemic institutional inertia” resist transformative 
changes (Ostrom 2004, 2007).
4.2 Reducing Vulnerability—Strict Regulation of the 
Floodplains
This is a scenario in which China prioritizes flood risk reduc-
tion and attempts to reverse the trend of increasing economic 
losses to floods by interfering and shaping developments 
on its floodplains. While a range of floodplain management 
options is available and need to be explored in China to 
strengthen the virtually nonexistent nonstructural measures 
for flood risk reduction, the biggest challenge for this path-
way is how far it can go without interfering with economic 
development. Given China’s extremely high dependence on 
its floodplains, a pathway that prioritizes flood risk reduction 
by limiting economic development will almost certainly 
encounter tremendous difficulties.
Floodplain management for flood risk reduction is a 
particularly weak component in flood management in China. 
There are still many win-win solutions where integrative 
floodplain management can achieve both economic develop-
ment and flood vulnerability reduction. Table 2 shows some 
initial results of the future flood risk scenario study in the Tai 
Lake basin, with a focus on the scope of risk reduction by 
careful land-use planning (Wang, Cheng, and Yu 2010). In all 
of the three scenarios they have analyzed—socioeconomic 
change only; climate change only; and combined impacts of 
socioeconomic and climate change—there is significant 
scope of potential flood loss reduction through careful risk 
mitigation-oriented land-use planning, which is nonexistent 
at present. Yet, in all three scenarios, even with careful 
land-use planning, expected annual flood losses will continue 
to increase, ranging from 3.64 to 8.01 billion yuan per year by 
2050.v
The positive results of this pathway would push China 
towards a more balanced approach between structural and 
nonstructural measures for flood risk management. But 
reversing the trend of increasing economic losses to floods 
in the future without major interference with the current 
trend of development intensification in the floodplains, both 
urbanization and industrialization, is highly unlikely.
4.3 Building Resilience—Living with Floods
The third potential pathway incorporates components from 
the two previous scenarios and rests on a series of changes 
that embrace variability and uncertainties, thus moving 
towards a strategy of building resilience and living with 
floods. Many regional flood studies have identified the need 
to break the feedback loops that have resulted in increasingly 
fragile and rigid systems with continuously declining 
capacity in coping with flood and waterlogging. Resilience 
strategies, such as the “space for water” program to regain the 
system’s natural flood adjustment capacity, are essential for 
achieving the sustainability of flood risk management in the 
future.
In this scenario, the current flood management institutiona l 
shift in China takes strong root in the coming years. China 
moves to adopt a resilience flood risk management strategy 
that seeks to restore the feedbacks required for a resilient and 
adaptable flood risk system in the future. A series of principal 
changes are critical for this scenario. First, the objective 
in flood risk management is not solely to reduce flood losses 
but to ensure the good functioning of human-environment 
systems on the floodplains in terms of the overall benefits 
from human use and ecosystem services and functions, taking 
into account risks and uncertainties associated with flooding 
(Green 2010). Risk management focuses not only on flood 
losses, but on anticipating the “threshold” or “boundary” 
losses that could fundamentally undermine the sustainability 
of the system. In this perspective, the absolute number of 
direct flood economic losses may not be as important as the 
ratio of such losses to GDP, since the latter can serve as 
a boundary or threshold variable that must be managed. 
Figure 2 shows the direct economic losses and their 
Table 2. Expected future flood risks in the Tai Lake basin and benefit of land-use planning




2050– Socioeconomic and 
climate change 
Expected annual damage 
(billion yuan)
Without land-use planning 6.69 7.14 13.23
With land-use planning 3.95 3.64 8.01
Benefits of land-use planning (billion yuan/year) 2.75 3.50 5.23
Source: Wang, Cheng, and Yu 2010.
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corresponding ratio to GDP in China from 1991 to 2004. It is 
clear that while the two are certainly correlated, their trends 
can be different depending on economic (GDP) development. 
For instance, while the direct economic losses in 1991 were 
roughly the same as in 2002, the loss to GDP ratio was 
significantly lower in 2002. The losses in 2002 were much 
less of a disturbance to the system than those in 1991.
In the near future, China could focus on two specific goals 
in this respect. One is to aim for a continued reduction in the 
loss of life due to floods. With continued socioeconomic 
development and improvement of general well-being, exces-
sive loss of life due to floods will be increasingly unaccept-
able, socially and politically.vi The other goal should be 
to lower the ratio of flood economic loss to GDP, which 
on average stands around 1 percent in the early twenty-first 
century in China, considerably higher than that in most flood-
prone developed countries such as the United States (average 
ratio 0.03 percent) or Japan (0.2 percent) (Xiang 2003).
Second, effective flood management strategies are based 
on experimenting and learning to live with floods; land-use 
adaptation is essential (Klijn, van Buuren, and van Rooij 
2004). A full range of floodplain management tools can and 
should be used to address the flooding problems in China, but 
the combination and integrated application of those tools will 
vary among places and communities. Their effectiveness will 
have to be assessed locally (White 1945, 1974, 1994). Since 
1998, the implementation of the “space for water” program in 
China has encountered tremendous difficulties, partly due to 
the strict and inflexible top-down scheme that overlooks local 
dynamics and regional variations.
Third, “controlled flooding” can be applied innovatively 
as a central strategy to deal with and embrace natural vari-
ability and uncertainty. It seeks to manage floods not only as 
hazards but also as a resource. Controlled flooding seeks to 
allow places to be flooded when there is excessive water but 
is flooding by design in terms of locations and sequences. 
It is a way to accommodate and retain the natural river 
dynamics and, at the same time, to minimize flood losses and 
maximize the benefit of natural floods. In the coming decade, 
major investment can be made to modify and readjust the 
existing massive flood defense structures so they are adapted 
from flood control to controlled flooding. The designated 
flood detention and retention areas (with a total area of 
about 5 percent of the flood-prone areas) would be the prior-
ity areas to initiate such experiments. One critical enabling 
condition to make the controlled flooding approach plausible 
is the rapid technological advancement in recent decades in 
flood forecasting, real-time monitoring, and transformative 
changes in communication technology (White 1998).
While a resilience flood risk management approach is 
possible, implementation of such a strategy often is beset 
with major socioeconomic dilemmas, such as balancing and 
accepting major investment in the short term while seeing 
benefits only in the long term. Shifting the short-term, small-
scale rationality to the long-term and large-scale rationality 
that a resilience strategy requires is not only a challenge for 
Chinese society, but globally a major obstacle for the pursuit 
of sustainability (Klijn, van Buuren, and van Rooij 2004; 
Turner 2010). As illustrated by the Dongting Lake case (Han 
2011), or the Poyang Lake case (Shankman, Davis, and Leeuw 
2009) and Tai Lake (Taihu) case (Harvey, Thorne et al. 2009), 
a resilience strategy requires many trade-offs, each of which 
embodies a range of difficult social, economic, and political 
issues including investment, compensation, social justice and 
social stability, poverty reduction, ecosystem services, and 
biodiversity. 
Looking into future flood risks in China, a broader 
approach is needed, which integrates comprehensively the 
vulnerability components and aims for building resilience. 
Until that is done, the “dyke syndrome” will remain and the 
vicious circle of “higher dyke—more development—even 
higher dyke” will continue. Ultimately, it is a hard choice 
to make between less return and more resilient and more 
short-term gains and less resilient in the long run. So far, few 
modern societies have chosen the resilience path. To do so 
requires nothing less than a paradigm shift to embrace rather 
than control and eliminate variability and uncertainty. That 
requires fundamental change in the way we perceive the 
world, what we believe, and the ways we act (Holling 1996, 
2001).
Figure 2. Direct economic losses due to floods and their ratio to GDP in China: 1991–2004
Source: Yang 2005.
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5 Conclusions
By outlining three fundamental dilemmas and three plausible 
pathways for managing future flood risk in China, this article 
concludes:
As the development on floodplains in China continues and 
intensifies in the coming decades, climate change will very 
likely increase both the intensity and the frequency of 
extreme weather events. Accordingly, China will need to 
learn to live with an increasing vulnerability to flood risk 
in the foreseeable future. To reduce human vulnerability 
to floods, multiple pathways exist but all involve difficult 
trade-offs. Hard choices are inevitable and inescapable.
China needs a new flood management strategy—one that 
incorporates vulnerability reduction and resilience building. 
Compared with the traditional engineering approach, a resil-
ience approach requires not only changing the focus from 
modifying flood hazard events to reducing vulnerability. But 
it is also essential to embrace and internalize variability and 
uncertainty in decision making. The latter is essential for 
changing the management bias from community prepared-
ness achieving full protection or zero flood risk. While 
vulnerability reduction must be integrated into overall devel-
opment planning, society will always be vulnerable as long as 
people live in and develop floodplains. 
A resilience strategy for managing flood risk thus requires 
human adjustment to flood, but not an approach aiming for 
full protection and control but for adapting human uses of 
floodplains, integrating, and experimenting with a wide range 
of flood risk management options. In this way, a reasonably 
dynamic balance, while not perfect, can be achieved between 
exposure and response capacity, and flood risk can be 
contained at a level judged to be socially and economically 
acceptable.
While a resilience strategy embodies a wide range of 
opportunities for long-term sustainable flood risk prevention 
and mitigation, it also raises major challenges. China faces 
major dilemmas in managing its future flood risks. Trade-offs 
between economic development and flood vulnerability 
reduction and between cooperation and tensions across 
diverse actors and scales cannot be escaped. 
Floods are part of Chinese culture, and for many in the 
floodplains a way of life. Moving from flood control to 
controlled flooding is a strategic choice towards living 
with floods in its true meaning. It requires a broad flood 
risk management approach that is centered on vulnerability 
reduction and resilience building of the social-ecological 
system within which the overall goal of sustainability is 
considered paramount and overall well-being is pursued.
An effective flood risk strategy will only emerge as a result 
of social learning and innovation and through human interac-
tions with the flood risk system. Embracing variability and 
uncertainty will be the departure point. Given the past thirty 
years of transformative changes in the country, China may be 
a place where such a policy experiment and innovation are 
not only timely but also embraced.
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Notes
i Taihu (Tai Lake) is the third largest fresh water body in China, with 
an area of over 2000 km2. The drainage basin of the Tai Lake covers 
36,985 km2, including some of the most economically developed 
areas in the delta region of the Yangtze River.
ii In 1949, China had only six large reservoirs. The 42,000 km levees 
were in poor condition.
iii In comparison, this number in the United States is about 40,000 km. 
In Japan it is less than 10,000 km, in the Netherlands it is about 
4800 km, and in India 20,000 km.
iv According to the Ministry of Water Resources, there were 30,413 
(36 percent of the total) “sick and dangerous” reservoirs in China in 
2009: of these 143 were large reservoirs, and 1118 were medium-
sized reservoirs. These reservoirs now present a severe source of 
flooding risks threatening hundreds of millions of people and huge 
areas of cropland.
v Current annual average flood economic losses amount to less than 
2 billion yuan in the Taihu basin; in the 1990s the annual average 
flood economic losses were around 70 billion yuan nationwide (Xiang 
2003).
vi The annual average loss of life due to floods in China is still above 
2000 people. 
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